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The nineteenth century ‘revolution in government’, from which a 
dramatically altered relationship between central and local government 
emerged, is of central concern to social historians. This article uses the 
work of Pierre Bourdieu to analyse the struggles between the magistracy in 
Cheshire and the Home Office over the centralisation of prisons and 
policing between the 1820s and 1840s. During this period legislative 
enactments increased the role of central government in monitoring and 
overseeing administrative management in both areas and this produced 
both direct and indirect conflict. The article argues that Bourdieu’s 
concepts of ‘field’, ‘capital’ and ‘habitus’ provide a framework for 
analysing the changing relationship between central and local government 
which makes evident the effects of divisions between and within social 
classes and enables the varying nature of the course and outcome of 
conflicts to be understood. Overall the analysis demonstrates the potential 
of the approach to be used more widely to explore the changing 
relationship between central and local government in other areas of social 
policy. 
 
 
Maryse Tennant        1
Fields of Struggle: A Bourdieusian Analysis of 
Conflicts over Criminal Justice, c. 1820-18501 
Government in the early nineteenth century was guided by the basic 
principle of ‘local provision, for local wants, locally identified’.2 The role 
of central government was essentially limited to maintaining the security of 
external relations, both diplomatic and fiscal, the payment and staffing of 
services related to this, and the provision of ultimate force for the 
maintenance of internal order in emergencies. Localities were granted 
coercive authority to ensure local governance and they applied this with a 
large degree of independence and discretion. By the mid-point of the 
century, however, a steady process of centralisation had resulted in a shift 
in the balance of power between the two with ‘“general rules and 
directives” increasingly becoming the prerogative of the centre and 
“details” the substance and limit of local discretion’.3  
Prior to the 1820s most social reform took place at a local level but 
over the next four decades the government began to take a more forceful 
role, first through the introduction of model clauses acts and later by 
establishing rules and regulations, mechanisms for inspection and grants in 
aid.4 Early legislation was often permissive or applicable only in limited 
circumstances but over the course of the century the discretion of local 
government was reduced and the administration of social policy was 
increasingly conducted by professional or elected bodies implementing 
national legislation. The reform of both prisons and the police roughly 
followed this general trend, although policing was traditionally more 
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embedded in local communities and, in England and Wales, has still not 
been subjected to the direct control of central government. 
The general trend of centralisation was not uniform across different 
areas of social policy since the chronology, course and outcome of 
centralisation processes varied and movement was frequently characterised 
by hesitation, improvisation and conflict. Local government at this time 
was diverse and reform operated through the auspices of Quarter Sessions 
made up of local magistrates, MPs, voluntary bodies and parish 
government. During the 1830s important legislation was introduced in 
relation to both policing and prisons which increased the role of central 
government and this generated the potential for tension in the following 
decade over the relative authority of local and central government. This 
article employs the concepts of ‘field’, ‘capital’ and ‘habitus’, taken from 
the work of Pierre Bourdieu, to analyse the centralisation process in 
relation to policing and prisons in the county of Cheshire between 
approximately 1820 and 1850. It argues that conflict was most evident in 
relation to prisons and this can be explained by the differing structures of 
the penal and policing field. Interpretations of such processes based on 
divisions relating to social class cannot incorporate the conflicts which 
occurred within class groups and such a perspective is essential when 
analysing relations between central and local government. A Bourdieusian 
approach offers significant advantages over a more traditionally Marxist 
account of the centralisation process as it incorporates a more flexible view 
of both social class and the State. 
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Theorising Central-Local Relations 
Centralisation did not merely entail modifications of the superstructure of 
the State but also represented a shift in the social distribution of power and 
this makes it vital that historians trying to understand the effects of such 
changes have some way of theorising power relations. The changing 
relationship between central and local government in the nineteenth 
century has generated both Whig and revisionist interpretations with the 
former focusing on bureaucratic changes and seeing centralisation as an 
inevitable and beneficial process while the latter present accounts centred 
on the displacement of one economic élite by another. Revisionist 
discussions are more finely attuned to the significance of the shifting 
distribution of power, therefore, but often struggle to provide a convincing 
depiction of the local arm of the State.5  
Richard Volger’s study, Reading the Riot Act, provides a more 
sophisticated picture of the changing relationship between local and central 
government in relation to the enforcement of public order in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Volger draws on the work of Nicos Poulantzas to 
examine the changing relationship between different agencies of the State 
(the army, the magistracy, the police and central government) by analysing 
ten specific incidents of disorder between 1831 and 1981. He argues that 
Poulantzas’s work helps to rectify some of the ‘serious drawbacks’ of 
Marxist explanations of the State in part because Poulantzas conceives of 
the local State as a social relation and a condenser of class forces, rather 
than merely a scaled-down version of the central State, and this makes 
   4 
 
apparent the organic relationship between central and local government.6 
Volger’s work is sophisticated and marks an important advancement in 
understanding central-local relations in the nineteenth century.  However, it 
remains tied to a traditional Marxist conception of class. Although Volger 
analyses both conflicts between central and local government and those 
within them, he is only able to do so by conceiving of agents as 
representatives of either the landowning interest or the bourgeoisie.7 
The current article contributes to Volger’s understanding of an 
organic relationship between central and local government by drawing on a 
theoretical perspective which, although undoubtedly influenced by Marxist 
thinking, is not tied to an economically determined model of class. A 
Bourdieusian perspective allows the complex and heterogeneous relations 
involved in struggles between central and local government to be analysed 
but also moves away from a model which sees divisions as being 
predominantly class based. This makes evident the importance of conflict 
between and within dominant social groups and enables a more nuanced 
analysis of the varying trajectories and outcomes of struggles over 
centralisation. 
At the core of Bourdieu’s approach are three interrelated concepts: 
field, capital and habitus. Bourdieu conceives of the social world as a space 
comprised of a series of hierarchically organised fields which he defines as:  
a structured social space, a field of forces, a force field. It contains 
people who dominate and people who are dominated … a space in 
which various actors struggle for the transformation or 
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preservation of the field. All the individuals in this universe bring 
to the competition all the (relative) power at their disposal. It is 
this power that defines their position in the field and, as a result, 
their strategies.8 
The power or resources which agents bring to these competitions, and 
which determine both their position and their strategic orientation within 
the field, are referred to as ‘capital’.9 Capital is a resource which yields 
power within a particular field and it operates both as a weapon and a stake 
of struggle.10 However, Bourdieu does not conceive of agents simply as 
‘“particles” that are mechanically pushed and pulled about by external 
forces’. Agents’ actions or practices are the result of both their position and 
‘an obscure and double relation’ between a habitus and a field.11 Habitus 
has similarities to the notion of habit and refers to ‘something which one 
has acquired, but which has become durably incorporated in the body in the 
form of permanent dispositions’ but which is not the result of fully 
conscious calculation. It is ‘acquired through the lasting experience of 
social position’ and is both durable and transposable.12 Habitus has a 
circular relationship with the objective structures of society since it is a 
product of one’s position within the game but also has an efficacy which 
shapes the future position and practice of a player.13 
The interplay of field, capital and habitus is best described through 
Bourdieu’s metaphor of a game. He suggests that a field represents a state 
of play between different players each equipped with piles of tokens of 
different colours (capital). Their position in relation to other players is 
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determined by the volume and make-up of these piles and it is, 
accordingly, capital which makes ‘the games of society […] something 
more than simple games of chance offering at every moment the possibility 
of a miracle’.14 The moves players make within the game, however, are 
only partly determined by their position and the chances available to them 
within the game. The other aspect which influences decisions is the agent’s 
‘feel for the game’ or ‘practical sense’ of the field and their position and 
chances within it (habitus).15  
Such an approach contributes to a traditional Marxist understanding 
of conflict between central and local government both in terms of the 
concept of class and understandings of the State. Within a Bourdieusian 
framework, class is not simply determined by the levels of economic 
capital possessed. Fields are structured ‘in such a way that the closer the 
agents, groups or institutions which are situated within this space, the more 
common properties they have, and the more distant the fewer’.16 Groups 
and agents positioned closely together in the field of power can be 
considered a ‘theoretical class’ and Bourdieu distinguishes these from 
social classes in reality which represent groups that are acknowledged by 
the society under study through language, organisations and symbolism. 
Theoretical class is, then, explicitly a metaphor and provides a model 
within which there is room for an infinite and changeable number of social 
groupings. Similarly the relative degree of dominance of a particular class 
differs not only over time but between fields and so social structure is not 
merely replicated unbendingly throughout society. These factors enable 
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competition within dominant groups to become a central part of analysis in 
a way which is rare in Marxist-influenced work.17  
Bourdieu’s conception of the State also offers advantages for 
exploring the process of centralisation. For Bourdieu, the State does not 
represent ‘a well-defined, clearly bounded, unitary reality’. 18  Instead it 
consists of an ‘ensemble of fields’ in which the central stake involves the 
monopoly over the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence.19 The 
State is, therefore, dispersed throughout social space and is not simply 
reducible to the government or politics. Both penality and policing, as 
fields in which the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence are 
key, would, therefore, form part of the State, although operating with their 
own unique dynamics and laws of functioning. Associated with State 
power is a specific form of capital which operates as ‘a sort of meta-
capital’ capable of influencing the value and distribution of other forms of 
capital across all fields. Bourdieu refers to this as statist capital and sees the 
field of power as the arena in which agents compete for this meta-capital.20 
Bourdieu distinguishes four fundamental types of capital (economic, 
cultural, social and symbolic) but recognises that other forms are relevant 
in specific fields.21 Symbolic capital is the most elastic of these, referring 
to any type of capital which is legitimately recognised as having value 
within a given field and so encompassing a wide range of resources.22 In a 
Bourdieusian analysis of the penal and policing fields during the nineteenth 
century, several types of capital can be identified as having value but the 
most prominent form was symbolic capital – the authority to make 
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decisions concerning the operation and administration of the various agents 
and agencies within the fields. Symbolic capital is ‘the basis of the specific 
authority of the holder of state power’ and a crucial component of this is 
the power of nomination, or the authorization to appoint and dismiss 
officers of State.23 The central struggle within the policing and penal fields 
in the nineteenth century concerned the relative levels of symbolic capital 
of various groups and agents, especially over this power of nomination. 
The analysis which follows draws upon these concepts to explore the 
centralisation process in relation to prisons and policing between about 
1820 and 1850 and the conflicts which accompanied this. It is important to 
recognise, however, that the current discussion adopts a somewhat 
restricted notion of the two fields. Punishment clearly involved more than 
just imprisonment and there were prisons run directly by central 
government in this period but this article concerns itself only with struggles 
relating to the management of county gaols and houses of correction. 
Similarly, the policing field did not merely include the public police but 
they form the focus of the current analysis. Before going on to consider the 
specific course of struggles over these two areas in the county of Cheshire 
it is first necessary to give a brief account of the reform of prisons and 
policing in Bourdieusian terms. 
The Reform Process 
Centralisation within the penal and policing fields between 1820 and 1850 
mainly involved a shift in the balance of power between central and local 
government. In essence, the symbolic capital of local government was 
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reduced and that of central government expanded. Prior to this, however, 
symbolic capital was more widely dispersed and there had been a 
preceding process of centralisation in which justices of the peace, the 
primary agents of local government for most of the nineteenth century, 
increased their levels of symbolic capital within the policing and penal 
fields. 
Authority over county gaols was split between justices of the peace 
and the Sheriff whereas Houses of Correction were ‘professedly under the 
direct administration of the justices of the peace.’ 24  Magistrates were 
responsible for the conveyance and detention of offenders and were 
empowered to gather economic capital from the county rate to do so, 
although provision was minimal and gaols ‘were carried on as the profit-
making concerns of the gaolers’ with fees charged for almost all services, 
including release.25 The job of inspection traditionally lay with the Sheriff 
and the Grand Jury, providing a small role for wealthy local inhabitants in 
the penal field. However, in 1791 this power of oversight was transferred 
to the magistrates who were compelled to regularly ‘visit and inspect’ 
prisons.26 The most significant actor within the gaol was the governor who, 
in the eighteenth century, was relatively free to impose regulations of his 
choosing.27 The power of nomination over this crucial office was vested in 
the magistrates and this formed a fundamental aspect of their symbolic 
capital. 
Within the policing field, the dispersal of symbolic capital was wider 
and practices varied. The inseparable relationship between the work of 
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parochial constables and the law meant that magistrates inevitably had 
authority over them and eighteenth century pamphlets describe constables 
as the subordinate officers of the justices who were bound by law to 
execute their warrants. 28 Magistrates were also responsible for applying 
penalties in cases of misconduct as well as swearing constables in, thus 
vesting them with their legal authority. However, the power of nomination 
was not definitively that of the justices and various practices existed for 
appointing constables. 29  High constables and special constables were 
selected by magistrates but parish constables were chosen by either the 
parish vestry or, as was most common in Cheshire, the Court Leet. 
However, there had been a long process of drawing constables more firmly 
under the control of justices of the peace from the sixteenth century and 
this continued into the nineteenth.30 In the 1820s, therefore, magistrates 
had significant levels of symbolic capital within both the policing and 
penal fields. Central government played a minimalist role and reform was 
largely a local affair. 
Prior to the 1820s, legislative enactments relating to prisons chiefly 
served to limit the value of economic capital by prohibiting the payment of 
fees and encouraging regular salaries in their place.31 This did little to alter 
the balance of power between central and local government and was, in any 
case, difficult to enforce. Other reforms depended on local government 
using its statist capital though private Acts of Parliament to introduce new 
initiatives. The first significant alteration to levels of symbolic capital in 
the penal field was the 1823 Gaol Act which made it a ‘duty of the Justices 
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to organise their prisons on a prescribed plan’ and required them to report 
quarterly to the Home Secretary on conditions in these institutions.32 This 
established central government as an agency within the field in possession 
of some degree of symbolic capital but again included no mechanisms for 
enforcement and so did little to directly empower the government.33 
The pace of change intensified from 1835 when central influence was 
given more potency with the introduction of a small government-appointed 
Inspectorate and the requirement that the Home Secretary must approve 
prison rules and diets. These new powers were augmented over the next ten 
years by legislation which bolstered the position of the inspectorate and 
introduced further regulations.34 These developments have been described 
as ‘revolutionary’ and significantly altered the balance of power between 
central and local government in relation to county prisons in two ways.35 
First, the inspectors represented new agents within the field. Although they 
lacked their own symbolic capital, their reports significantly expanded the 
informational capital available to central government, and this was 
essential in enabling them to enforce their symbolic capital. Secondly, the 
role of the Home Secretary in sanctioning prison rules and diets was a 
powerful statement of central government’s influence over prison 
conditions and this was extended by ‘ever increasing regulations made by 
the Home Office on every detail of prison life’.36 In 1865, the government 
increased its ability to utilise this symbolic capital by employing economic 
capital as a tool of coercion through the mechanism of government grants 
which could be withheld for non-compliance with rules and regulations. 
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Finally, in 1877 the process of centralisation was completed when the 
control and ownership of county gaols was transferred to the Prison 
Commission, thus ending the role of local government in the penal field.37 
Reform in the policing field followed a similar pattern but varied in 
outcome, falling short of full central control. Legislation prior to the 1830s 
focused on altering the role and value of economic capital within the field 
by permitting official payments for police work in an attempt to use 
‘avarice to overcome inertia’, thus increasing prosecutions. 38 Other aspects 
of reform at this time were reliant on private legislation, usually through 
the mechanism of Improvement Acts, a model which many towns adopted 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 39  In 1830 the 
government passed an Act enabling towns to introduce paid police officers 
without the expense of a specific statutory measure.40 Later the Municipal 
Corporations Act, 1835, obliged incorporated towns to introduce a Watch 
Committee to oversee local policing.41 Such initiatives usually vested the 
nomination and control of any constables appointed in the hands of a 
corporation or elected Commissioners and so did not significantly alter the 
relationship between central and local government. 
The first shift in the balance of control within the policing field did 
not occur until 1839, sixteen years later than in the penal field, and was 
more tentative, relying on permissive legislation. The County Police Acts 
of 1839 and 1840 enabled magistrates to appoint a force of paid officers for 
all or part of their county.42 The decision to adopt lay with the Quarter 
Sessions but, once made, provided a statutory role for the Home Secretary. 
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He was to approve the selection of a chief constable and any subsequent 
changes to the overall manpower of the force, as well as setting rules and 
regulations for any constabularies established. The permissive nature of 
this legislation left counties free to resist central influence but this move 
marked a significant alteration to the dynamics of the policing field, at least 
in those counties which implemented the Acts. 
One less recognised impact of this legislation was that it broke the 
traditional relationship between local communities and the appointment of 
police officers, thus removing the symbolic capital which wealthy local 
residents enjoyed at the Vestry or Court Leet. Under the County Police 
Acts the appointment of constables was subject to a hierarchical chain of 
command, being the responsibility of the Chief Constable, who was in turn 
selected by the magistrates (though with the approval of the Home 
Secretary). From 1842, partly as a result of low levels of adoption, a 
second model for police reform developed which included no role for 
central government. The Parish Constables legislation did alter the 
structure of the policing field, however, by shifting the power of 
nomination over unpaid parish constables from vestries or Courts Leet to 
the justices and this provision was compulsory across the country.43 It also 
permitted magistrates to appoint salaried superintending constables to 
oversee paid and unpaid parish constables in their district. Ratepayers 
retained greater levels of symbolic capital than under the County Police 
legislation, however, since the decision to appoint paid parish constables 
lay with them.  
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These two approaches to reform co-existed until the County and 
Borough Police Act, 1856, ‘took the principles of 1839 and made them 
mandatory’, rendering the establishment of a county constabulary 
compulsory across England and Wales. 44  It was, therefore, no longer 
possible to opt out of central government influence. The capacity of central 
government to use its symbolic capital was also increased with the 
introduction of grants for efficiency and a national inspectorate. Although 
changes continued to be made to this tripartite system of governance 
centred on a Chief Constable, the Home Secretary and the Quarter 
Sessions, the idea of a mixed system of control combining elements of 
local and central authority over policing persists to this day. 
Conflicts over Prisons 
Prior to the Gaol Act of 1823, Cheshire had shown a commitment to prison 
improvement. In 1783 it passed a local Act to improve standards of 
decency and discipline in gaols and houses of correction and this was one 
of the initiatives which influenced the national legislation of 1791, an 
indication of the degree to which central government was guided by its 
local partners in the early stages of reform.45 The magistrates also 
substantially re-built Chester Gaol and constructed a new house of 
correction at Knutsford. Improvements continued to be made at both sites 
after 1823, some of which were necessitated by specifications within the 
Gaol Act.46 
In the early nineteenth century, the Quarter Sessions appointed 
Committees to inquire into such things as prisoners’ diet, the construction 
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of solitary cells, and the introduction of crank mills and a stepping wheel.47 
Direct communication between the magistrates and the Home Office in the 
1820s, however, was limited and evinces little signs of tension. There were 
requests for clarification or advice on the part of the magistrates and 
appeals for information from the Home Secretary but central government’s 
prime concern related to its ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of 
internal order. 48  The magistrates had some concerns about problems 
emanating from section 24 of the 1823 Gaol Act which prevented those 
convicted of any offence more serious than petty larceny from giving 
evidence in court, feeling that this made it difficult to prosecute robberies 
committed in prison. 49  Overall, however, the initial increase of central 
government’s symbolic capital generated little tension. 
There was an increase in correspondence following the Prisons Act 
of 1835, often relating to aspects of the Inspector’s reports. These were 
detailed and included recommendations as to best practice as well as 
cataloguing infringements of government regulations. The Inspectors’ 
lacked any direct symbolic capital, however; their role ‘was to inquire and 
report as to the state of the several gaols’ but they could not make or alter 
any regulations already in place. 50  Occasionally the Home Department 
exerted pressure on magistrates to rectify problems highlighted by the 
Inspectors but it did not act in all instances. For example, as early as 1836 
Captain Williams, the Inspector for the northern district of England, 
reported that the surgeon in Chester Gaol did ‘not inspect prisoners upon 
committal before they are classed’ but it was not until his report in 1841 
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that the Home Secretary  questioned whether any ‘steps have been taken to 
correct this omission’.51 
Increasing tension becomes evident around 1840 when two 
complaints prompted central government intervention and the tone of these 
letters is markedly different to those of the 1820s. In the first case, a debtor 
in Chester Gaol complained of ‘violent treatment on the part of the 
Governor’ and the Home Secretary – Lord Normanby – requested that the 
magistrates would ‘make inquiry into Day’s statement and report the 
result’ to him. In the second, a solicitor objected because he had been 
denied access to one of his clients, a prisoner in Chester Gaol, in response 
to which Normanby directly demanded ‘why Mr Parry has been refused 
admittance to see the prisoner Brooks.’ 52  Complaints were sometimes 
simply passed back to local government, however, with requests for 
‘observations’ or ‘information’.53 
It was the newly acquired symbolic capital of central government 
over rules and regulations which generated most conflict. In January 1840 
Normanby declined the magistrates’ application to construct additional day 
rooms at Chester Gaol, stating that he could not ‘sanction any outlay of 
money for the object proposed by this Court of Quarter Sessions’ and this 
shift to a position where central government could dictate how magistrates 
should spend the economic capital raised through local taxes was a 
significant one within the field.54 There was further disagreement in 1841 
over the wine allowance within the prison rules and this persisted for five 
months. The correspondence concerning this concluded with a polite but 
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firm statement confirming the symbolic capital of central government 
within the field: ‘the 2nd Section of the Act 5 & 6 Wil. 4 c.38 provides that 
when the “Secretary of State shall have subscribed such Certificate or 
Declaration, such Rules and Regulations, alterations and additions, shall be 
binding upon the Sheriff and all the persons”’; the rules Normanby had 
approved were, therefore, the only regulations which could be ‘legally 
adopted and enforced’.55 
There was less communication concerning Knutsford House of 
Correction. The Inspector’s report of 1841 highlighted that prisoners were 
being punished without the governor’s sanction, a practice Captain 
Williams considered illegal and ‘at variance with every principle of 
justice’. The Home Secretary reiterated that this deviated from the law and 
requested to be ‘informed whether it has been discontinued’.56 Generally, 
however, the report was positive and Williams concluded by expressing his 
‘satisfaction’ with the prison’s governance which he attributed ‘solely to 
the keeper’, a Mr George Burgess; this positive tone was not to continue.57 
In February 1843, Thomas Duncombe, the radical MP for Finsbury 
and ‘the Chartists’ best friend in Parliament’, drew the attention of the 
House of Commons to ‘the manner in which the Lord Chief Baron 
Arbinger discharged his duty as a judge’ during the recent trial of Chartist 
prisoners in Lancashire and Cheshire. 58  Duncombe gave a long speech 
ranging over a number of issues, one small part of which concerned 
allegations about the treatment of two prisoners at Knutsford. His motion 
for an inquiry into the conduct of Lord Arbinger was comprehensively 
   18 
 
defeated by 228 votes to 73, but the matter was not quite over. Six days 
later Cheshire’s MP, William Tatton Egerton, spoke to the House with a 
view to ‘correcting the inaccuracies’ in Duncombe’s statements about 
Knutsford. Egerton denied several of the allegations and claimed that the 
chief source of complaint – threatening language used by the governor – 
was essential to enforcing the discipline of the gaol under rules which, he 
reminded Parliament, were ‘adopted under the authority of the Secretary of 
State for the Home Department’. His speech failed to achieve its intended 
effect and instead instigated a government appointed inquiry under the 
auspices of Captain Williams which was to examine ‘all the circumstances 
of the case’.59 
Williams investigated a number of specific allegations but also 
uncovered additional failings in the management of Knutsford House of 
Correction. He concluded that the central complaint was unfounded as, 
although the alleged words had been spoken, they were used only as an 
acceptable warning. Overall he considered that the governor’s treatment of 
prisoners at Knutsford was ‘humane’ but he identified a lengthy list of 
regulation infringements including irregularities in the punishment of 
prisoners, insufficient allocations of food and exercise, neglect of sick 
prisoners and an absence of printed rules in the cells. More serious for the 
governor was the discovery that county funds and property had been 
misappropriated and, yet more damning still, that Burgess had, in 1841, 
continued to allow the whipping of a young prisoner after the surgeon had 
declared that the ordeal should cease.60 
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Sir James Graham – the new Home Secretary – responded to the 
report by requesting the magistrates to consider whether they could ‘with 
safety and confidence’ continue to employ Burgess ‘in an office of such 
responsibility’. He made his own position clear by reminding them that the 
governor was guilty not only of ‘indiscretion’ and ‘inattention’ but also of 
‘very great misconduct’. However, he acknowledged the magistrates’ 
unchecked power of nomination within the field by stating that they had 
‘finally to decide on the governor’s conduct’, a position he reiterated in 
Parliament: the power to elect or remove the governor ‘was absolutely 
vested by law in the Court of Quarter Sessions’.61  
The magistrates’ response to the inquiry was unexpected: they 
dismissed the prison chaplain, who had been charged with no offences by 
the inspector but had revealed things to Williams not previously disclosed 
to them. However, they took no action against the governor or the surgeon, 
both of whom had been criticised. The magistrates submitted a report to 
Graham justifying their actions which reads as a litany of excuses for the 
governor. In some cases others were blamed, including the magistrates 
themselves, in others it was argued that such practices were longstanding 
or that Burgess had acted in good faith: property stolen was of 
‘inconsiderable value’; irregularities in recording punishments were a 
‘clerical error’. All charges but one were considered to be ‘not of much 
importance’. The prolonged whipping of the young boy was recognised as 
‘serious’ but the magistrates contended that, since Burgess had already 
been ‘severely reprimanded’, no further action was necessary.62 It is true 
   20 
 
that many of the offences were minor infringements of government-
imposed regulations which had been taking place for some time, often with 
the cognisance of the magistrates. In many ways, then, the Report was not 
so much a vindication of Burgess (to whom, as we will see, the magistrates 
later showed little loyalty) as a defence of local government’s autonomy to 
manage the prison without interference from the centre. 
The magistrates’ defiance prompted a second, more forceful, letter 
from Graham which threatened the independence they sought to preserve. 
He reiterated his concern at their decision, adding the ominous warning 
that this may ‘lead to evil consequences’ by ‘reducing the confidence 
Parliament has been disposed to impart to magistrates in the 
superintendence and regulation of gaols’.63 Later in May, Duncombe, still 
dissatisfied, called for further investigations and Egerton again rose to 
defend the magistrates. He made clear that his opinion differed from that of 
his colleagues but repeated the string of excuses given previously and 
argued that the magistrates – gentlemen ‘residing on the spot and 
accurately acquainted with the whole circumstances of the case’ – were 
‘better judges than the House might be what was the real state of the 
question’; a clear endorsement of the importance of vesting symbolic 
capital in local government.64 Graham felt that the facts of the case were 
already well established but revealed the ‘evil consequences’ that lay 
behind his threat to the magistrates by proposing new legislation giving the 
Home Secretary concurrent powers of dismissal over prison staff.65  
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Two months later Graham had drafted legislation empowering the 
Home Secretary to suspend or dismiss any ‘Gaoler, Keeper, Governor, 
Master, Surgeon or Medical Officer’ (but not, interestingly, chaplains) in 
future cases of misconduct.66 This Bill was never to reach the statute book, 
however, being withdrawn due to time constraints a month later. Graham 
hinted that he might reintroduce the measure in the next session, and 
Duncombe questioned him on this in February 1844, but there the matter 
rested.67 Later that year the Cheshire magistrates finally dismissed Burgess, 
ostensibly for an unrelated incident, but The Times was sceptical: 
The magistrates … were highly indignant that such a functionary 
[the Home Secretary] should presume to interfere with an 
important body like the Cheshire magistracy in the management of 
the gaol. However, having the fear of the bill giving concurrent 
jurisdiction to the Home Secretary before their eyes, they seized 
upon another pretext at the earliest convenient opportunity, and 
dismissed the governor.68 
The extent to which the Cheshire magistrates had ‘knuckled under’ to 
government pressure was even more evident in their choice of successor: a 
government nominee formerly of the centrally controlled Pentonville 
Model Prison.69 
This confrontation fits uncomfortably into a model which sees the 
state (local and central) as a condenser of class struggle since most of the 
key actors (apart from Burgess) came from a genteel or aristocratic 
background; this was not a conflict between a declining nobility and an 
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emergent bourgeoisie. Graham was ‘the head of a long-established and 
influential family’ and Duncombe a member of the landed gentry.70 The 
Cheshire magistrates were also predominantly landed, although there were 
a few middle class members by the 1840s. A closer reading of the debates 
over the Burgess affair, however, offers no indication of division along 
class lines. Ten magistrates who participated in the vote about Burgess’s 
future can be considered to come from middle class backgrounds and nine 
of these voted to retain his services. Indeed there was almost universal 
consensus about Burgess’s fate and the chaplain’s dismissal, with just five 
magistrates voting against either of these motions. Four dissenters came 
from prominent gentry families and the fifth was the son of a prosperous 
cotton manufacturer. Similarly, four were Liberals and one a Conservative. 
What united them is that they had all sat, were sitting or would in the future 
sit as MPs. 
From a Bourdieusian perspective it is significant that all those who 
were in accord with central government were MPs. Agents who were both 
magistrates and MPs, or even aspiring MPs, were positioned both within 
central and local government and their ‘social trajectory of chances’, and 
so habitus, was affected by this. 71 Their future in the world of politics 
depended upon their actions at a local level, particularly in a clash with 
central government. This overlap between the two branches of government 
is important, although one should not overestimate it: only six of the forty 
magistrates involved in voting over whether to respond to Graham’s letter 
were MPs at some point in their lives and it was the four who were most 
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active in Parliamentary matters who voted in support of central 
government. The two outliers both had seats in Parliament but are recorded 
as making no speeches during their career whereas the other four all made 
in excess of thirty.72 
This protracted and public dispute demonstrates the desire of the 
majority of the magistracy to retain their independence within the penal 
field: as one justice stated, ‘it is our affair and we will act in this matter as 
we think proper’.73 Their resistance to the Home Secretary’s requests was a 
demonstration that, as things stood, they retained that crucial aspect of their 
symbolic capital – the power of nomination – and Burgess’s continuation 
as governor for almost a year after the inquiry is a reflection of their 
autonomy. Central government, however, was becoming increasingly 
confident in its use of the symbolic capital it possessed and was not afraid 
to threaten the use of its ultimate power – statist capital – to ensure 
compliance with its wishes. Whether the government would have gone so 
far if it had not been so persistently pushed by Thomas Duncombe can only 
be surmised. Similarly, it is telling that the government used statist capital 
merely to pressure the magistrates, backing off from any attempt to 
actually alter the structure of the penal field, a task not undertaken for a 
further twenty-two years. 74  Yet the government had made its point: it 
expected compliance from the magistrates in the management of prisons 
and was keen to ensure that it had influence over the discipline of staff 
even if this fell outside its official remit.  
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Accustomed to playing a role within the penal field from the 1820s, 
by 1835 the government increased its involvement in the management of 
prisons and adopted a more direct and forceful approach. Its habitus 
changed slowly, however, and it was after 1839 that significant shifts in the 
use of symbolic capital by central government can be seen through more 
frequent references to legislation – demonstrating the basis of this symbolic 
capital – and a greater keenness to carry its point over key issues. By the 
1840s, therefore, central government had begun to use its symbolic capital 
more flamboyantly and it was this which helped to generate the 
magistrates’ entrenched response to the disagreement over Burgess. 
Conflicts over Policing 
There was much less tension in the interactions between local and central 
government over policing in the period covered mainly because there 
remained the possibility of opting out of central government influence in 
this sphere after 1839. Centralisation followed a different course and 
chronology with tension most prominent in the 1830s and occurring within 
local government. As with prisons, the power of nomination was a central 
element but conflict over this concerned the magistrates and local 
ratepayers with central government playing a minimal role. This alternative 
course can be explained by three key differences between the structures of 
the policing and penal fields. The first relates to the fact that 
representations of law and order were more central to the logic of the 
policing field, thus making fears of central control more acute. The second 
concerned the boundaries of the policing field which were much wider 
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since policing, like the law, has a universal characteristic which draws all 
social actors within it to some degree and this formed a contrast to the 
relatively closed world of the penal field.75 The third difference – the wider 
dispersal of symbolic capital within the policing field – resulted from the 
other differences since the extensive boundaries of the policing field and 
the sensitive nature of the importance of representations of law and order 
necessitated a broader devolution of power. In essence, there was a further 
tier of local government within the policing field in the form of ratepayers 
– the middling sorts or parish élites – who exerted an influence over 
policing and so possessed a degree of symbolic capital, including the 
power of nomination. This meant that ratepayers had an investment in the 
stakes and struggles of the policing field, not only as potential recipients or 
users of police action, but also in terms of possessing authority, and this 
added a further dimension to the process of centralisation. 
The two national models for police reform which existed after 1839 
affected the symbolic capital of ratepayers differently but in Cheshire the 
situation was further complicated by the establishment of its own 
Constabulary in 1829.76 This initiative has been described as ‘the earliest 
police reform’ in provincial England and it continued in operation until it 
disbandment in the wake of the County and Borough Police Act of 1856.77 
The Cheshire Constabulary was introduced by a piece of private legislation 
and emerged out of collaboration between central and local government. 
The initial impetus for the scheme was local but the finer details were 
negotiated with the Home Secretary, a process which resulted in authority 
over the force being mainly vested in the magistrates at Quarter Session. 
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Cheshire’s Act empowered, but did not compel, the justices to 
appoint salaried Special High Constables for any hundred in the county 
and, on the recommendation of three justices at Petty Sessions, Assistant 
Petty Constables for the townships.78 These men were controlled by local 
magistrates and funded out of a two-tier system which drew from both the 
county and the poor rates, with the Special High Constable’s salaries paid 
from the country rate on the Hundred but those of the Assistant Petty 
Constables from the poor rates.79 This represented an alternative form of 
policing to the unpaid parish constables and, since it was firmly under the 
authority of the justices, reduced the ability of local communities (outside 
boroughs) to exert control over policing. The power of nomination lay 
entirely with the magistrates and so ratepayers were excluded from any 
significant input and lacked direct authority over their local officer, their 
only influence being the capacity to limit any salary to £20 per annum.80 
Informal mechanisms of control within local communities were also 
reduced because most paid constables were responsible for groups of 
townships. In the early years of its operation the Constabulary encountered 
significant opposition which mainly resulted from this change to the 
structure of the field.  
Bourdieu considers that agents wishing to displace dominant 
representations or forms primarily use strategies of succession or 
subversion. In this light we can see that opposition to the new constabulary 
relied partly on attempts to subvert the police by withholding assistance 
and introducing rival forms of policing.81 The prominent form, however, 
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involved attempts to supersede the Constabulary by forcing its 
disbandment. The Quarter Sessions quickly began to receive petitions 
requesting the removal of Constabulary officers and in April 1831 the 
strength of opposition in one area of the county – Nantwich Hundred – 
forced the magistrates to authorise a reduction of constables in that 
district.82 There was a delay in enforcing this which amplified hostility and 
in the following year a county-wide meeting resolved to petition 
Parliament about the excessive rates imposed in Cheshire, with the 
Constabulary forming the chief source of complaint.83 The petition alleged 
that county business had been badly managed and its first point concerned 
‘the arbitrary and oppressive manner in which the Cheshire Constabulary 
Act was carried into execution’. 84  It was argued that there had been a 
‘denial of justice to those ratepayers who appealed for redress’ and there 
was resentment at ‘the additional fees extracted by these extra police-
officers’. The ratepayers were disappointed in their appeal to central 
government as the petition received little sympathy from Parliament, but it 
did succeed in forcing the magistrates finally to reduce the number of 
constables in Nantwich.85  
Petitioning was a way of using the small amounts of political capital 
available to the middle classes to influence local and central government. 
The petitions were, among other things, an expression of the ratepayers’ 
resentment at their loss of status within the policing field, which formed a 
significant threat to their local power base. Although the Constabulary 
continued to exist, opposition was a testament to the ability of the middle 
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classes to resist a form of policing which they perceived as acting to protect 
landed interests rather than their own. One of the indirect effects of this 
opposition was to generate a degree of ambivalence among the magistrates, 
particularly in areas where opposition was strong, with the result that their 
implementation of the Act lacked the degree of firmness necessary for the 
Constabulary to succeed, at least in some areas.86 
This experience of struggle with local ratepayers generated 
dissatisfaction among some magistrates and so, when the prospect of 
central government influence was introduced in 1839, there was a little 
enthusiasm for the national scheme. Two justices proposed adopting the 
County Police Act in October 1839 but the motions were postponed for 
‘serious and mature consideration’.87 The issue was reconsidered in March 
the following year, but, by this time, uncertainty had turned to negativity 
and the proposal was rejected by fourteen votes to seven.88 Instead the 
magistrates chose to implement their own Constabulary more uniformly 
throughout the county, a measure slowly introduced over the next two 
years. Support for the County Police Acts did not instantly dissipate, 
however, and a further motion was introduced in 1841 suggesting adoption 
solely in the rural southern districts of the county, although this was also 
unsuccessful.89  
Over time, as the Cheshire force was implemented more consistently, 
support for the measure grew and opposition declined.  By 1851, the 
magistrates were prepared to go to the expense of a second private Act to 
alter the funding arrangements for their force, moving to a single rate 
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levied on each hundred of the county which was remarkably similar to the 
County Police legislation. It also broke the last remaining connection 
between constables and individual townships since officers were attached 
to Petty Sessional divisions. During their discussion of the Cheshire 
Constabulary Amendment Act, the justices reiterated their preference for 
their ‘present Constabulary’ as opposed to one which entailed 
‘centralisation’ and greater expense. Their decision to incur the expense of 
private legislation instead of adopting the County Police Acts is worth 
exploring in greater detail.90 
Philips and Storch consider that the Cheshire magistrates’ rejection 
of the County Police Acts was a way of proclaiming that their county was 
‘already well policed at a moderate cost’ and avoiding a bitter conflict 
among the county justices. 91  This interpretation places the ‘regional 
centralisation’, which Steedman sees as ‘one of the clearest results’ of the 
County Police Acts, at the core of the decision made in Cheshire. 92 
Steedman is not, however, referring to regional centralisation in terms of 
the township level of governance but the shifting of authority over policing 
from the Petty Sessions to the Quarter Sessions, a move which favoured the 
wealthier magistrates who made up the county élite. A closer analysis of 
the ways in which the proposals raised in Cheshire would have affected the 
structure of the policing field, however, demonstrates that it was actually 
the increased influence of central government that was being resisted. 
The key difference between the Cheshire Act and the County Police 
legislation, which was unavoidable under any of the proposals raised at the 
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Quarter Sessions, was the introduction of greater government influence 
over policing. This is because the legislative framework was flexible and 
allowed a number of options for implementation. Two of the proposals 
made in Cheshire concerned only a few districts within the county and this 
would have avoided any bitter conflict among the justices about the 
balance of power between the Quarter and the Petty Sessions. In such cases 
a county constabulary would operate much as the force in Cheshire did, 
although with no role for the Quarter Sessions other than to approve the 
initial decision. 93  Once the initial decision to adopt was taken, the 
magistrates at Petty Sessions replaced the Quarter Sessions in managing 
the force and a superintendent acted in the role of Chief Constable. If these 
proposals had been successful, therefore, the Quarter Sessions would 
actually have had less power within the district(s) chosen. 
It was actually in 1829, when the Cheshire Act was drafted, that the 
balance of power between the Petty Sessions and the Quarter Sessions was 
in question. By the 1840s strong central control within the county was 
widely accepted and it was this that enabled a firmer implementation of the 
Constabulary, another legacy of the opposition of the preceding decade. 
Parsimony does not seem a persuasive explanation either: not only was the 
county prepared to spend money on a new piece of legislation but, by 1853, 
Cheshire’s own force cost slightly more than the average expenditure of 
other county constabularies and more than twice that of the largest 
overheads in counties with superintending constables. 94  However, it is 
important to remember that the costs for the parish constable model do not 
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include payments to parish constables and so underestimate the total 
expenditure on policing. By rejecting the County Police legislation, what 
the Cheshire magistrates actually avoided was an increase of the symbolic 
capital of central government within the policing field.  
Philips and Storch are right, however, to suggest that the debates over 
the County Police Act in Cheshire  should lead us to reject an uncritical 
reading of the ‘rhetoric of police reform’ as, again, a model based strictly 
on class divisions does not quite fit the evidence.95 There was a clear class 
element to the conflict between the magistrates and the ratepayers – 
although it must be remembered that there was some overlap between these 
groups. However, the ratepayers petitioning against the police were mainly 
middle class and the magistrates were predominantly landed gentry or 
aristocrats. It was not, therefore, the industrial bourgeoisie who were at the 
forefront of the opposition to the Constabulary in Cheshire. Although fears 
that the County Police Act would force agricultural districts to pay to 
protect the property of manufacturers were raised in debates at the Quarter 
Sessions – an aspect suggestive of traditional class conflict – the most 
sustained support for this legislation actually came from magistrates in 
rural districts.  
There is no evidence, therefore, of division among the magistrates on 
the basis of class or social position. The justices who supported adoption of 
the County Police Acts were all landed gentry and the magistrate who led 
the campaign was a prominent figure at the Quarter Sessions and a member 
of the county élite. Additionally, in this conflict, there is no evidence of 
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magistrates who were MPs voting in favour of central government 
influence, but this was not a public and direct clash, as was the case of 
Burgess, and so their trajectory of chances in the political sphere was not at 
stake.  
The most obvious line of division related to geographical area with 
the most persistent commitment to the County Police model emanating 
from the rural hundreds in the south where struggles with the ratepayers 
had been fiercest. The difficulties in implementing the Constabulary in 
these areas generated support for a different approach and a desire to 
further reduce the influence of township ratepayers over policing decisions. 
These struggles were inherently rural (much opposition stemmed from the 
perception that the magistrates were using the police to supplement their 
game protection) and belonged to a wider class struggle – that ‘long affray’ 
between the middle classes and the landed gentry over poaching which 
reminds us that ‘the most relentless, the most persistently brutal and 
embittered – and the most continuous – current of violence running through 
the nineteenth century was not urban, but rural’. 96  The habitus of 
magistrates in these areas was influenced by their local circumstances and 
prior experience of reform.  
The impact of prior experience is also evident in the overall decision 
of the magistrates to reject the County Police Acts which was influenced 
by the existence of their own constabulary. The existence of the Cheshire 
Constabulary enabled the magistrates to resist the encroachment of central 
government whilst also ensuring there were sufficient mechanisms for 
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maintaining order; a choice not available to other counties until the Parish 
Constables legislation was introduced and, even then, this did not offer the 
ability to dislodge ratepayers from their traditional position within the 
policing field. The structure of the policing field presented a dual threat 
against which the magistrates needed to defend themselves. What they 
negotiated, and eventually fairly comprehensively agreed upon, was a way 
of securing their dominance in the field against the ratepayers without 
ceding symbolic capital to central government. 
Conclusion 
Central government made moves to increase their levels of symbolic 
capital within both the policing and the penal fields across the first half of 
the nineteenth century. The most significant legislative movements towards 
this occurred in the 1830s and this generated significant moments of 
conflict between central and local government in the following decade. 
However, the course and chronology of change differed between the two 
fields and this produced direct conflict only within the penal field. The 
government was prepared to use its symbolic capital with confidence and 
firmness in relation to struggles over prisons; they expected compliance 
from the localities and were prepared to legislate in order to ensure this. In 
relation to policing, however, the permissive nature of the legislation of 
1839 meant that conflict was indirect and the government remained content 
to let the localities opt out of increased influence from the centre, wise to 
the more sensitive nature of assuming control within this sphere. Conflict 
over central government control took place within the magistrates, 
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therefore, and concerned whether they should adopt the County Police 
model. Direct conflict over policing happened earlier and involved the two 
tiers of local government. The Cheshire magistrates were, then, keen to 
defend their symbolic capital in both fields but they faced an additional 
threat from ratepayers within the policing field and this also structured their 
actions, making some of the magistrates willing to concede some symbolic 
capital to the centre. A Bourdieusian analysis helps to illuminate the 
reasons for the different course and chronology of struggles between the 
policing and the penal fields because it focuses attention on a detailed 
analysis of the position of agents within them, thus making their subtly 
different structures evident. 
A Bourdieusian analysis also enables a close reading of the dynamics 
of struggles over centralisation which can accommodate social class but is 
not dependent on that concept alone, allowing other possible reasons for 
division, both within and between local and central government, to be 
examined. Class was evident as a factor in the conflicts between 
magistrates and ratepayers within the policing field, but it was much less 
relevant to struggles between central and local government where many 
actors came from similar social positions. In these struggles, other factors 
become relevant in explaining the actions of agents both in terms of their 
position and habitus. In the very public standoff between the Cheshire 
magistrates and the Home Office over Knutsford House of Correction it 
was the position of magistrates in relation to central government which 
seems to have divided opinions. However, in the policing field the prior 
experience of magistrates in struggles with local ratepayers had greater 
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importance. A Bourdieusian approach, therefore, has the capability to 
incorporate class conflict where this is relevant but also enables other 
factors to be assessed. It has the flexibility to produce a nuanced account of 
the various struggles which occurred but also to fit these within a wider 
framework and so address both the general and the particular. 
Furthermore, Bourdieu’s recognition that the State is not ‘a well-
defined, clearly bounded and unitary reality’ is surely invaluable when 
exploring the relationship between central and local government in the 
nineteenth century.97 The resultant focus on an ensemble of fields in which 
the stake of struggles concerns the monopoly of physical and symbolic 
violence clearly positions the law, policing and punishment within the State 
without making them part of a definite embodiment of this. This approach 
is capable of incorporating the decentralised nature of government in the 
nineteenth century and the organic relationship between central and local 
aspects of the State. It also has the potential to accommodate the diversity 
of experiences across the provinces in the early period of penal and police 
reform and to understand these as distinct instances indicative of more 
general patterns. In relation to policing specifically, such an approach 
enables the indirect nature of government control over public policing to be 
understood and this is especially important when analysing the reform of 
‘civilian municipal’ policing organisations where central government did 
not adopt full and direct control.98 A Bourdieusian analysis is capable of 
recognising that punishment and policing were within the State, in the 
sense that they formed part of the government’s monopoly over the use of 
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force, but does not reduce them to simple apparatuses or tools of central (or 
local) government, instead representing them as arenas shaped by the 
struggles between many agents and groups for power and influence. 
Such an understanding is evident to some degree in Volger’s analysis 
of public order, at least with relation to policing. The crucial aspect that a 
Bourdieusian perspective adds is the flexibility to analyse conflicts without 
conceiving of them as essentially and necessarily representing competitions 
for dominance between different social classes. The main, but not sole, 
clashes over centralisation in the nineteenth century were between central 
and local government and in these there was such a high degree of overlap 
in terms of class that other aspects become indispensible to understanding 
the course of conflicts. Bourdieu’s framework is able to include an infinite 
number of social groupings which are not necessarily replicated 
unbendingly throughout all areas of society, thus enabling the differences 
between magistrates or between politicians to have a more central place 
and providing a structure which can incorporate the varying local 
circumstances of groups of actors. This offers potential for identifying 
common elements among the assorted trajectories and outcomes involved 
in the many local struggles over centralisation. An application of 
Bourdieu’s work to conflicts over policing and prisons in Cheshire, 
although limited both geographically and chronologically, is suggestive of 
the potential of this approach to be used more widely to explore the 
relationship between central and local government in other areas of social 
policy and at different stages of the centralisation process. 
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